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Some Basic Problems in Criminology 
By JEROME HALL 
THE enormous literature on method- 
ology which has appeared in the 
last decade has, despite criticism and 
admonitions from certain quarters,' re- 
sulted in a much clearer appreciation of 
the limitations of contemporary social 
science. Thus, for example, there is 
now considerable understanding of the 
huge proportions and significance of 
linguistic difficulties. If, as Sapir and 
others tell us, language is the vehicle of 
thought, then the difficulties are by no 
means purely philological; much more, 
they require an infinitely more thor- 
oughgoing analysis than has heretofore 
been attempted. This means that for 
an indefinite period to come, the lan- 
guage problem and all that it involves 
will be a chief concern of social scien- 
tists. 
There are other valuable lessons to 
be learned from this literature, for 
these discussions have been pushed 
sufficiently far to permit a more so- 
phisticated reading and evaluation of 
sociological writing than was previously 
possible. We are able to see many 
interrelationships among the problems 
investigated. And we are beginning to 
understand how much of social "sci- 
ence" is really social policy more or 
less disguised; in short, how much of 
sociological writing consists of expres- 
sions of approbation or displeasure. 
And in the rare instances where a high 
degree of objectivity exists, we are in a 
better position to understand and 
evaluate the particular job by our 
greater appreciation of the various 
fundamental approaches to and inter- 
pretations of social science. In short, 
our frames of reference have been con- 
structed for us. 
All of the above applies to crimi- 
nology more forcibly than to most 
social disciplines. For purposes of sim- 
plifying this discussion and keeping it 
within the set boundary, we shall pre- 
sent very briefly three principal ap- 
proaches which for convenience may be 
termed the "rigorous scientific," the 
"scientific method," and the "unique 
data" interpretations, respectively. 
The knowledge found in criminology 
may be subsumed under different 
categories described in the various in- 
terpretations set forth. From such a 
demonstration of the relationship of 
criminology to these three interpreta- 
tions of social science, and of the rela- 
tionship of these interpretations to each 
other, it is hoped that something will be 
added to our understanding of some of 
the major problems presented by the 
contemporary literature of criminology. 
THE RIGOROUS SCIENTIFIC 
POSITION 
Very happily for our present under- 
taking, we may set forth the "rigorous 
scientific" position by reference to the 
recent publication of the most thor- 
oughgoing critique on criminology and 
criminal law and its administration 
that has yet appeared.2 This analysis 
of the field is the product both of a logi- 
cian and philosopher and of a law 
teacher who has had many years of 
practice at the bar. After a compre- 
hensive survey of the field, they arrive 
at the following conclusions: 
1 Ellwood, C. A., "Scientific Method in 
Sociology" (1931), 10 Social Forces 15-21. 
2Michael, J., and M. J. Adler, Crime, Law and 
Social Science, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1933. 
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I. There is no scientific knowledge in the 
field of criminology. 
A. We have no knowledge of the causes 
of criminal behavior or of the ef- 
fects of different modes and varie- 
ties of treatment upon actual or 
potential offenders, or of the 
efficacy of programs and measures 
of prevention. 
1. In the absence of such knowledge 
we are and will continue to 
be impotent to control crim- 
inal behavior. 
B. The knowledge which has resulted 
from criminological research is 
knowledge descriptive of the 
characteristics of criminals and of 
their environments. 
C. This descriptive knowledge has lit- 
tle utility in the solution of the 
practical problem of controlling 
criminal behavior, either through 
programs of prevention or through 
the official treatment of offenders. 
1. It can be employed only in 
trial and error attempts to 
control criminal behavior, 
and therefore has little prac- 
tical value. 
2. Such attempts cannot now be 
made the basis of experi- 
mental programs and, there- 
fore, have little theoretical 
significance. 
II. Empirical scientific research in crimi- 
nology cannot be undertaken at the 
present time. 
A. The subject matter of criminology is 
criminal behavior, and criminology 
is, therefore, a dependent science. 
B. Criminology depends in large part 
upon the subject matter of psy- 
chology and sociology, and these 
subject matters have not yet been 
developed as empirical sciences. 
C. Since no theory or analysis has been 
developed in the fields of psychol- 
ogy and sociology, scientific re- 
search is not yet possible in these 
fields. 
D. The possibility of scientific research 
in psychology and sociology de- 
pends upon radical changes in the 
methodology of investigation in 
these fields, and this, in turn, de- 
pends upon the correction of the 
misconception or inadequate con- 
ception of empirical science and 
scientific method which is now 
prevalent in these fields and which 
we have characterized as raw 
empiricism.3 
Without attempting a systematic 
summarization of this book, which is 
impossible within the limits of this 
paper, we shall very briefly present the 
general thesis maintained, which led to 
the above conclusions, namely: 
Problems are either theoretical or 
practical. Practical problems concern 
affairs, procedure, or action; they in- 
volve the fixing of an end which it is 
desired to achieve, and the determina- 
tion of means to accomplish it. On the 
other hand, theoretical problems are 
questions as to knowledge-never as to 
decisions. When we answer theoreti- 
cal problems our conclusions are either 
true, false, or probable; whereas the 
answers to a practical problem are wise 
3 Ibid., pp. 390-391; and in connection with the 
last statement above, note: ". . . the scientific 
method . . . is hardly more than the native 
method of solving problems, a little clarified from 
prejudice and a little cultivated by training. A 
detective with his murder mystery, a chemist 
seeking the structure of a new compound, use 
little of the formal and logical modes of reasoning. 
Through a series of intuitions, surmises, fancies 
they stumble upon the right explanation, and 
have a knack of seizing it when it once comes 
within reach. I have no patience with attempts 
to identify science with measurement which is 
but one of its tools, or with any definition of the 
scientist which would exclude a Darwin, a Pas- 
teur or a Kekule." Gilbert Lewis, The Anatomy 
of Science, p. 6. 
Cf. also, "The principle of the scientific 
method, in fact, is only a refinement, by analysis 
and controls, of the universal process of learning 
by experience. This is usually called common 
sense. The scientific addition to common sense 
is merely a more penetrating analysis of the com- 
plex factors involved, even in seemingly simple 
events, and the necessity of numerous repetitions 
and controls before conclusions are established." 
A. J. Carlson, "Science and the Supernatural" 
(1931), 73 Science, 218. 
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or unwise, intelligent or unintelligent, 
just or unjust. There are two ways of 
determining whether means are adapted 
to ends: common sense and the method 
of empirical science. Common sense is 
frequently adequate and in the degree 
that the practical problem is simple; 
with increased complexity, common 
sense becomes more and more inade- 
quate. 
After stating the problems which 
arise from crime, the criminal law and 
its administration, the authors of the 
survey proceed to their most basic in- 
quiry, namely, "the conditions of a 
science of criminology."4 "Criminol- 
ogy consists of information about 
the activities and nature of criminals, 
their environments, and the ways in 
which they are officially and unoffi- 
cially treated by social agents and 
agencies."5 The central problem in 
criminology is that of the causes of 
crime; accordingly the significance of 
criminological knowledge depends upon 
the ability of this knowledge to solve 
the etiological problem. A cause is 
discovered by finding "the precise na- 
ture of the relation of dependence which 
obtains between a given item on the 
one hand and one or more items on the 
other hand."' Interdependent items 
are called yariables, and the inquiry in- 
volves the nature of their covariation. 
SCIENCE DEFINED 
The authors then define science: it 
consists of propositions which must 
have (1) generality, (2) determinate 
validity, (3) a formal character as a re- 
lation of variables, and (4) compend- 
ency. If the validity of all the proposi- 
tions rests upon the validity of a small 
number of propositions, that is, if we 
have a systematically ordered set of 
propositions, we have a rational science 
as distinct from an empirical science. 
Say Professors Michael and Adler: 
"The body of knowledge called crimi- 
nology does not contain a single scien- 
tific proposition."'7 They inform us as 
to what must be done: First, the re- 
search must be directed by a problem- 
atic proposition;8 second, the data must 
be both reliable and accurate; third, the 
data of observation must be developed 
by processes of inference. 
As will be noted by reference to the 
above summarization, the approach 
taken consists of setting up a very 
rigorous definition of "science" and 
classifying the knowledge in the field of 
criminology with reference to that 
definition. That the adherents of this 
position are perfectly aware of their 
procedure is definitely shown by their 
statement that "we are using empirical 
science in a sense which includes phy- 
sics and excludes anatomy."' If this 
terminology is borne in mind, their 
classification of criminology as "com- 
mon sense" knowledge becomes per- 
fectly understandable. They intend 
no depreciation of the knowledge in 
criminology in itself, but only in com- 
parison with science as defined. In 
fact, the authors of the work referred to 
are really upon common ground with 
many students of criminology in recog- 
nizing the value for certain purposes 
and within certain limits, of the best re- 
search in criminology.10 
4 Michael and Adler, op. cit., Ch. V. 
5 Ibid., p. 46. 1 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
I7 bid., p. 58. 
8 Cf. Professor E. W. Patterson: "... one 
must have some vaguely felt aim or need at the 
outset, but that one need not have a sharply 
formulated proposition to test. One must be 
willing to be led by the facts, one must realize 
that knowledge is a process of interaction be- 
tween sense-data and the assumptions of prior 
experience. Incipient generalizations become 
irrelevant because they are supplanted by dis- 
criminations suggested by the data turned up in 
investigation." "Can Law Be Scientific?" 
(1930) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 145. 
9 Michael and Adler, op. cit., Preface, p. xxi. 10 Ibid., pp. 331-2. 
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SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
The second position, which was in- 
spired largely by Pearson and in which 
major emphasis is placed upon method, 
is that taken by the younger group of 
sociologists. Many of these students 
of the social disciplines, in sharp con- 
trast with the older scholars, were re- 
cruited from physics, biology, and other 
sciences (note that we use the word less 
rigorously than above). In any event, 
they studied the natural sciences and 
attempted to take over as much of the 
methodology as could be employed on 
the particular social data studied. 
The demarcation of narrow areas for 
intensive empirical research has thus 
distinguished contemporary social sci- 
ence from the comprehensive systems 
associated with the work of scholars 
like Spencer and Ward. 
As has been stated, the major em- 
phasis of this group has been upon 
method. Their examination of the 
natural sciences leads them to conclude 
that although techniques vary and are 
admittedly more highly developed in 
the exact sciences, nevertheless the 
method employed (meaning thereby at 
its minimum the "logic of measure- 
ment "11) is common. Thus, Dr. 
George Lundberg writes: 
But when a general criterion or definition 
of science is attempted it is found that such 
definition tends to be in terms of method 
rather than of subject-matter. All that the 
term science as applied to a particular field 
comes to mean is a field which has been 
studied according to certain principles, i. e., 
according to scientific method.12 
Until it is carefully defined, the 
word "method," like the word "sci- 
ence," means all things to all men; and 
until attention is centered upon pre- 
cisely the same phenomena, it is futile 
to assert that a particular method is or 
is not scientific. Thus, Professors 
Michael and Adler state that scientific 
methods are not employed at present in 
social research."3 To understand their 
position, reference must be had to their 
definition of the two terms "science" 
(which has been stated above) and 
" method."'14 
Exactly the same observations with 
regard to the necessity for definition 
must be made with reference to the 
content of the social sciences. Al- 
though the younger sociologists freely 
admit that they have not discovered 
anywhere near the number of scientific 
generalizations which are found in the 
exact sciences, they nevertheless assert 
that scientific laws are simply descrip- 
tions of general types of behavior under 
certain specified conditions, and that 
the sociologists have already discovered 
a number of such laws.15 
11 G. A. Lundberg, in an unpublished paper. 12 Idem, Social Research, p. 92. 
13 They select psychometrics and mathematical 
economics as the only scientific divisions of the 
social disciplines. Both of these fields, it is sub- 
mitted, in so far as they are exact, are branches 
of mathematics, numbers being more or less 
arbitrarily assigned to data, and in this aspect 
are not social sciences at all. In the latter field, 
mathematical formulee could be readily fitted to 
the concept of the "economic man" of classical 
economists, which involves quite a different 
matter from dealing with human beings. Cur- 
rent institutional economics as a reaction from 
classical economics is significant from this point 
of view. 
14 That they apparently insist upon techniques 
as an essential part of "scientific method" may 
be gathered from the following: "The generaliza- 
tions of empirical science, like those of common 
sense, rest upon experience and are derived from 
it by prudence and intelligence; they differ in 
that in their derivation intelligence is directed 
methodically and is aided by special techniques, 
and in that taken together they constitute an 
analysis of some limited portion of experience 
which is the subject matter of a particular sci- 
ence." Op. cit., Preface, p. xxii. 
Cf. G. Lewis and A. J. Carlson quoted in note 
3, supra. 
15 Thus Dr. Lundberg writes: "What is a scien- 
tific law, but a brief description of how phenom- 
ena behave under given conditions? This is not 
only possible but has been practiced in a more or 
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Classification of knowledge-- 
If attention is now directed to some 
of the best research in criminology, as, 
for example, parole prediction and eco- 
logical studies of juvenile delinquency, 
several results follow. If our purpose 
is to classify this type of knowledge, the 
particular criteria selected will in part 
determine the distribution made. If 
the criteria be narrowed to methods, 
and methods be limited to the "logic of 
measurement," then these studies are 
"scientific." (We are referring here 
only to the classifications employed in 
the two positions discussed above.) If 
the criteria are propositions character- 
ized by a relation of variables, com- 
pendency, and so forth, and if methods 
include the techniques of physics, then 
the studies referred to cannot be "sci- 
entific" but must be "common sense") 
or some other category which is more 
apt. 
Clearly, if the term "common sense" 
is used as in ordinary speech, objections 
can be raised to the subsumption of 
the knowledge acquired through the 
methods employed to construct the 
prediction tables, under this category. 
However, it is obvious that the adher- 
ents of the position first described do 
not use the term in its ordinary conno- 
tation. They mean merely that it is 
not "scientific" (as rigorously defined 
by them). And they add, "we have 
not meant to say that such knowledge 
is the common possession of all men or 
that those men who possess it, have it 
to the same degree." 16 
A suggested solution- 
The opposition between the two 
positions thus far presented is in large 
part resolved by taxonomic analysis. 
A possible solution which suggests it- 
self is the adoption of a third category 
intermediate between "science," rigor- 
ously defined, and "common sense" as 
ordinarily understood. The use of the 
latter term cannot fail to connote 
knowledge which is common, despite 
the warning given in this connection. 
There accordingly is need, for certain 
important purposes, to have a third 
category which will include such re- 
searches as those mentioned; which 
will include psychiatry and medicine 
and other knowledge arrived at by the 
use of orderly, systematic procedures, 
and the application of which requires a 
trained, experienced judgment. 
So far as we know, it is a debatable 
question whether the use of objective 
techniques calls for a different kind of 
thinking from common sense me- 
thods, or indeed, whether these differ 
from the mental processes employed in 
rigorous scientific analysis or observa- 
tion. The question of the validity of 
categories invented to represent al- 
leged differences in method cannot be 
less systematic way from the very beginning of 
society. All that social science aims to do is to 
change this practice from a rule-of-thumb pro- 
cedure to an objective and more exact practice." 
"The uniformities in physical data which form 
the basis of all physical science are also observ- 
able in social data. As we have noted, scientific 
laws specify certain simple and frequently arti- 
ficial conditions under which phenomena behave 
in a certain way. Under these conditions, the 
behavior can be predicted with a high degree of 
accuracy. Likewise we can predict, with a high 
degree of accuracy, how many people in a given 
city will be born, will die, commit suicide, or get 
married during the coming year, provided, the 
significant conditions obtaining during the past 
years on which our observations are based re- 
main the same." Social Research, pp. 12, 15. 
And Dr. Read Bain, another adherent of the 
position presented, writes: "But sociology and 
other social sciences are rapidly building up a 
vast body of sound scientific knowledge which by 
reason of its quantic nature and criticism of 
common sense, or both, sounds as strange to the 
man on the street as endocrinology, radioactivity, 
or theories of immune sera." "The Concept of 
Complexity in Sociology: II" (1930), 3 Social 
Forces 373. 16 Michael and Adler, op. cit., p. 331. 
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settled absolutely; and the only clue 
that can be suggested is that all classi- 
fications are constructed to meet par- 
ticular needs (and for some, we want 
to emphasize the results of our thinking 
rather than our process). It depends, 
in short, very largely upon the purpose 
in hand. 
Under the circumstances and within 
the above limitations, all that can be 
stated is that it is possible to detect 
differentiae which are significant for a 
great many purposes. And it seems 
to the writer (which may be purely a 
personal predilection) that there is a 
broad basis for differentiating social 
science both from common sense and 
from empirical science as defined; from 
the latter because it is not exact, and 
from the former because it is not com- 
mon but confined to persons who have 
had specialized experience in a particu- 
lar field which qualifies them for an 
efficient behavior which cannot be 
expected of laymen however intelligent 
they may be. 
To this distinctive content of the 
social disciplines must be added an- 
other difference (from common sense) 
which they possess, namely, an orderly 
method which operates through the 
agency of various more or less elaborate 
techniques, a method which is care- 
fully designed to eliminate bias, to 
make possible the detection of all 
relevant data, to make use of all veri- 
fiable data, and to record the results so 
that they may be checked by other 
investigators. Of course there remains, 
among others, the difficulty that una- 
nimity is not quite so readily deter- 
mined as in the physical sciences; nor 
is it so widespread, which is to be 
expected. 
We know no way of determining the 
question regarding an adequate termi- 
nology except by reference to utility.17 
The desiderata of definiteness of deno- 
tation, comprehensiveness, and ab- 
sence of affective associations suggest 
themselves. Many of the principles 
applied by the philologists who are 
concerning themselves with the con- 
struction of an international language 
have some application. And the fact 
that a particular usage is customary 
may have greater disadvantages than 
benefits. 
Finally, the experience of the older 
sciences may be utilized. The termi- 
nology adopted by Professors Michael 
and Adler has this distinct advantage: 
science, rigorously defined, becomes 
relatively definite. Other types of 
knowledge may be very valuable, but 
will not be subsumed under the rubric 
"science." In addition to the defi- 
niteness thus attained in one direction 
at least, there is also the advantage of 
having direct attention called to the 
relatively smaller degree of validity of 
other types of knowledge, with the very 
salutary effect of fostering a skeptical, 
critical attitude and of dispelling the 
smugness that frequently results when 
terms and definitions are expanded to 
allow everyone from the professional 
prize fighter to the experimental physi- 
cist to rest under the coveted aegis of 
Science. 
"UNIQUE DATA" INTERPRETATION 
Even if it is impossible to secure 
considerable agreement on present 
1' Cf. "It is entirely arbitrary whether a 
given word shall be used to indicate a similarity 
or a difference. Thus, we employ the phrase 
'empirical science' in a restricted meaning which 
differentiates physics from criminology; we might 
have used it in a less restricted meaning in order 
to indicate the similarity of physics and crimi- 
nology as bodies of knowledge somehow based 
upon experience. The analysis would not be 
changed by this arbitrary change in usage, be- 
cause physics and criminology are clearly differ- 
entiable as bodies of knowledge, and hence some 
other word could be used arbitrarily to express 
this differentiation. Verbal usage may be 
arbitrary, but analysis is not." Michael and 
Adler, op. cit., Preface, p. xix. 
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controversial questions among ad- 
herents of the first two positions 
discussed, it is certain that the differ- 
ences between them are relatively 
minor when contrasted with those of 
the third position which we present. 
We refer to those scholars who hold 
that social data are unique 18 and that 
the methods of natural science and 
certainly rigorous scientific techniques 
are very inadequate in the study and 
understanding of social phenomena. 
Thus, Professor Maclver, one of the 
leading exponents of this view, writes: 
The trouble is that the social sciences 
suffer from certain embarrassments from 
which the "natural sciences" are more or 
less free. They have to deal with phe- 
nomena which involve a kind of causation 
unknown in the purely physical world, 
since they are "motivated," in fact brought 
into being, by that elusive and complex, 
but undeniable, reality, the mentality of 
man. Not a single object which the social 
sciences study would exist at all were it not 
for the creative imagination of social beings. 
Consequently the social sciences have to 
deal with variable and indeterminate con- 
cepts such as capital and labor, family and 
nation, state and sovereignty, crime and 
unemployment, folkways, institutions, so- 
cial attitudes, and other intangibles. The 
social scientist has no "natural" classifica- 
tions to guide him such as those with which 
nature is expected to accommodate the 
geologist or the entomologist. Under these 
circumstances every authority is free to de- 
fine his concepts in his own way and treat 
them in his own way.19 
The question of causation 20 is merely 
another phase of the question of knowl- 
edge. Control and prediction depend 
in part upon our knowledge of causes. 
Can we control criminal behavior by 
common sense knowledge? This ques- 
tion raises not only all the difficulties 
that we have previously considered, 
is Note the position of Professors Michael and 
Adler that it is possible to have an empirical sci- 
ence of criminology; and that social phenomena 
are no more complex, intangible, elusive, etc., 
than physical phenomena. Op. cit., pp. 72-74. 
19 MacIver, R. M., "Is Sociology a Natural 
Science?" (1931) 25 Publ. of the Sociol. Soc. of 
Am. 26-27. 
"If there is to be any 'objective' social science 
it will have to run in terms of the kind of ob- 
jectivity which social ends and procedures of ac- 
tion actually possess, which is strikingly different 
from that belonging to physical phenomena. 
The notion of 'uniformity of sequence' is anti- 
thetical to that of 'control' by the behaving ma- 
terial itself. There is, no doubt, considerable 
uniformity of sequence in social phenomena, but 
it runs in terms of meanings and values rather 
than physically described events. It is known 
by communication, Einfiihlung, 'sympathetic 
introspection' (Cooley). This notoriously fails 
to yield accurate results uniform for different ob- 
servers." Frank H. Knight, "The Newer 
Economics and The Control of Economic Ac- 
tivity," (1932) 40. Jour. of Pol. Economy, 440. 
"If we keep in mind both the historic and the 
teleologic aspect of social life, we see an inter- 
action and a mutual dependence between what is 
and what should be, between the actual historic 
cause and the ideal of what is desired. The sub- 
ject matter of social science thus differs from the 
subject matter of natural science not only in in- 
troducing the prospective or teleological point 
of view, which describes movements in terms of 
their goals, but in the more specific element 
of tradition which sometimes takes the form of 
conscious teaching and learning. We may say 
that the distinctive subject matter of the social 
sciences is cultural in the sense defined by Tylor, 
to wit 'the complex whole which includes knowl- 
edge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as 
a member of society'." 
"For an adequate account of the distinctive 
subject matter of the social sciences, we must 
take note of the element of tradition, of the ways 
whereby social conformity is brought about." 
M. R. Cohen, "The Social Sciences and The 
Natural Sciences," in Ogburn and Goldenwieser, 
Social Sciences and Their Interrelations, pp. 450, 
468. Professor Cohen's position is elaborated in 
his recently published Reason and Nature, 
20 Cf. Bertrand Russell's chapter "On the No- 
tion of Cause" in Mysticism and Logic: "All 
philosophers, of every school, imagine that 
causation is one of the fundamental axioms or 
postulates of science, yet oddly enough, in ad- 
vanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, 
the word 'cause' never occurs. . . . To me it 
seems that philosophy ought not to assume such 
legislative functions, and that the reason why 
physics has ceased to look for causes is that, in 
fact, there are no such things." P. 180. 
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but also the new one of "control." 
Certainly "control" in human society 
is not significantly limited to the direct, 
immediate behavior to which we refer 
when we speak of driving an automo- 
bile or throwing a ball. More than 
that, while men control physical ob- 
jects in this simple, direct manner, it is 
clear that they do not control natural 
phenomena in the same sense at all. 
They do make certain adjustments to 
them, and they can predict some of 
them. We can fairly well predict the 
number of deaths which will occur in 
the United States during the next ten 
years, but we can do little about con- 
trolling their occurrence. If we know 
that unemployment, poverty, and sub- 
normality increase criminal behavior, 
we cannot as a result of that knowledge 
lessen that behavior. 
Common sense and control- 
Control has been defined loosely, 
where it has not been entirely assumed 
without any attempt at definition, and 
it is impossible within the limits of this 
paper to discuss the question in any 
detail.21 If we ask does common sense 
knowledge permit us to "control" in 
any sense, we may merely note diverse 
answers which cannot now be under- 
stood. The authors of the survey 
referred to insist that etiological knowl- 
edge is scientific (as rigorously defined) 
and that only such knowledge can as- 
sist in controlling criminal behavior. 
At the opposite extreme, Dr. Frank 
Knight, who takes an extremely criti- 
cal, skeptical position,22 states that: 
Common sense does predict and control, 
and can be trained to predict and control 
better; but that does not prove that science 
can predict and control better than common 
sense. And it seems very doubtful whether 
in the majority of social problems the ap- 
plication of logical methods and canons will 
give as good results as the informal, intui- 
tive process of judgment which, when re- 
fined and developed, becomes art. Art is 
not science, and only within narrow limits 
can it be reduced to science (in which case 
of course it ceases to be art). It seems to 
us that science is a special technique de- 
veloped for and applicable to the control of 
physical nature, but that the ideal so con- 
stantly preached and reiterated, of carrying 
its procedure over into the field of the social 
phenomena rests on a serious misapprehen- 
Sion.23 
As is to be expected, the adherents 
of the "unique data" interpretation 
hold that social causation is different 
from physical causation.24 Without 
21 Cf. "If men are free they are not subject to 
'control' other than their own, and, if there is no 
freedom, we are all alike under the absolute 'con- 
trol' of physical causality, and all talk of social 
control is nonsense. Literal 'control' means 
that some are 'free' to 'control' others, meaning, 
again, that they have power to do so. We con- 
front the old question, or questions, of the r6le of 
the individual in history; how much and how 
fast can one man change the course of events, and 
what is the likelihood that any change he does 
produce is for the better? Even afterward, we 
cannot tell with any precision. In the mutual 
struggle of millions of individuals the effect pro- 
duced by any one on all the rest must very ex- 
ceptionally be appreciable, and its character de- 
pends on the good will and good foresight of the 
far future of those who do achieve some power. 
Historical students agree that most 'leaders' are 
largely followers, or accidental symbols of move- 
ments." Frank H. Knight, "The Newer Eco- 
nomics and The Control of Economic Activity," 
(1932) 40 Jour. of Pol. Economy 458. 
22 See Dr. Knight's discussion, op. cit. supra, 
pp. 458-468. 
28 Knight, Frank H., "The Limitations of Sci- 
entific Method in Economics," in The Trend of 
Economics, edited by R. G. Tugwell (1924), p. 
254. 
24 "But these quantitative indices are merely 
evidences of an interaction which they do not ex- 
plain; they are not the dynamic factors of which 
we are in quest. If we appreciate at all the na- 
ture of social causation we shall never expect to 
find that this factor A, presumptively measured 
by this quantitative indication a, contributes 20 
per cent, and so forth. Much ingenuity, and 
still more energy have been lavished on the at- 
tempt to reach results which the very nature of 
the subject matter precludes. Social phenomena 
are not, like certain physical phenomena, isolable 
components of a situation. Social phenomena 
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dwelling upon this angle of the prob- 
lem, it is obvious that we have also 
a linguistic problem here which has 
only recently been recognized with 
reference to the idea of control. Sig- 
nificantly enough, the recognition of 
the linguistic problem at this point has 
developed with and from analysis of 
this concept. 
BEHAVIORISM 
Underlying the third position de- 
scribed above is the suggestion that the 
social disciplines are more closely 
related to art than they are to science.25 
Without attempting to decide this 
issue, we may note the significance of 
this view with reference to behavior- 
ism. The literature of psychology 
during the past decade has been de- 
voted so abundantly to a considera- 
tion of behavioristic approaches that 
lengthy summarization is unnecessary. 
Furthermore, in view of the recent 
revolutionary changes regarding many 
fundamental theories in physics on the 
one hand, and of the newer meanings 
that have been assigned to "behavior- 
ism" on the other (by L. L. Bernard, 
A. P. Weiss, R. Bain, et al), it is im- 
possible to arrive at any but the most 
tentative conclusions. Opponents of 
behaviorism frequently direct their at- 
tack with reference to a very narrow 
definition of the term (made possible 
by the existence of many varieties), and 
assume also the continued existence of a 
mechanics which has all but disap- 
peared from contemporary physics. 
Many of the ablest advocates of be- 
havioristic approaches and interpreta- 
tions deny that their position calls 
for the reduction of social phenomena 
to the simplest physical phenomena. 
Along with these various developments 
which have accompanied analysis and 
research, we find, accordingly, concomi- 
tant changes in definition and termi- 
nology. 
RELIANCE UPON INTUITIVE PROCESSES 
Whether it is merely a temporary 
difficulty arising from a limited use of 
objective methods, or a permanent 
limitation which results from essential 
differences of social data, it seems clear 
that in the solution of problems which 
are dealt with in the administration of 
the law, we are compelled to utilize in- 
tuitive processes. Intention, planning, 
and motivation (though they may be 
merely general terms which represent 
a large number of acts) are necessary 
concepts. Nor does it seem possible 
at present to make a sufficiently de- 
tailed analysis of behavior to enable us 
to dispense with these concepts. With- 
out asserting that a highly developed 
behaviorism may not offer a more 
satisfactory explanation of the phe- 
nomena associated with motivation, 
sentiments, emotions, and so forth 
than is now derived by the use of the 
intuitive processes alone, it is necessary, 
at least in the administration of the 
law, to rely chiefly upon insight and 
imagination. Accordingly, if atten- 
tion be centered upon present tech- 
niques and upon explanations of 
behavior hitherto adduced by objective 
methods, it seems clear that it is neces- 
are aspects of a total non-mechanical consciously 
upheld system of relationships. . 
... 
Behind 
every social relationship lie social attitudes and 
interests, which are not separable forces but 
type-phases of dynamic personality." R. M. 
MacIver, Society, Its Structure and Changes 
(1951) p. 520. 
25 Cf. Gilbert Lewis, The Anatomy of Science: 
"The method of the chemist . . . [and] his data 
are far less exact [than the physicist's] .... Some are rough measurements, but the greater 
part are not even metrical in character. They 
are based upon the observations of thousands of 
different substances and from these observations 
come rough generalizations like the law of Men- 
del6eff." P. 169. 
"So, as the organic chemist acquires profi- 
ciency in this art, for indeed it is almost an art, he 
acquires an intimate acquaintance with his 
material." P. 174. 
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sary not only to employ physical and 
biological explanations to the fullest 
extent, but also to supplement these 
by explanations on a purely social 
level. 
Nor do we need to adopt the view 
that social data are essentially different 
from any other data. The question, 
in any event, is How can social 
phenomena be best understood? If we 
confine ourselves to present problems 
and to available explanations, certain 
conclusions are unavoidable. Thus, 
in criminology, the method of Dosto- 
ievsky, for example, is more valuable 
in understanding some types of crimi- 
nal behavior than any scientific tech- 
niques that have been developed thus 
far. Yet it is very frequently assumed 
(by simply ignoring it) that we must 
take imagination or insight as given, 
that we need not study, train, or 
cultivate it, and moreover, by placing 
entire emphasis upon objective meth- 
ods, that these latter are paramount. 
The best work in the social sciences 
is a combination of orderly method and 
trained imagination; and while we do 
not find this anywhere deliberately 
denied, and indeed the reverse is true, 
nevertheless we believe it may fairly 
be stated that a serious limitation of 
contemporary criminology is the failure 
to train and utilize the processes of 
insight and imagination.26 
This observation is entirely con- 
sistent with further empirical investiga- 
tion in the social sciences, with 
experimentation of every sort. It 
merely suggests that for an indefinite 
future, we must not expect compendent 
propositions whose validity may be 
determined in part by reference to 
scale, galvanometer, or test tube; but 
rather, we must continue indefinitely 
to use our most subtle imaginations not 
only in detecting small relationships in 
the vast mass of data that we collect, 
but, moreover, in interpreting, evaluat- 
ing, and using these small truths to- 
gether with the whole body of our 
experience in understanding the social 
life about us, including criminal be- 
havior. And of equal importance is 
the recognition of the fact that the 
methods employed in the social sciences 
provide, at the minimum, a large body 
of relatively detailed, reliable informa- 
tion upon which insight, imagination, 
and judgment can operate more effec- 
tively. 
DEGREE OF PRECISION REQUIRED 
Finally, it may be said that while 
researches in the social sciences, includ- 
ing criminology, do not result in prop- 
ositions which are as exact as those 
found in physics, it is necessary to 
note that such precision is not required 
in the administration of the criminal 
law. Precision itself is purely relative, 
and the need for any particular degree 
of precision is determined by the 
purpose in hand. This certainly is 
true in law. Thus the adoption of a 
wise policy by a legislature would not 
necessarily be in the least affected by 
the most precise data imaginable. 
Professor Herman Oliphant illus- 
trates the point very neatly as follows: 
A recent study of the labor injunction 
in New York shows that in about 60 
per cent of the cases, the temporary 
injunction was the only relief sought 
and granted. If the legislature should 
consider regulation of this type of 
remedy, it would not make the least 
difference whether the temporary in- 
26 Case studies are only a small beginning; the 
most detailed life histories, which have for the 
most part been best developed hitherto by the 
psychoanalysts, should be compiled without 
necessarily adopting the psychoanalytic ideology. 
Interpretations made by intuitive processes can 
be supplemented by further observation. And a 
communication (objectification) of their intuitive 
processes by judges, juries, etc. would be valu- 
able. Novelists and biographers who make no 
attempt to ape psychologists provide valuable 
material. 
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junction was the only relief granted in 
60 per cent of the cases or in 60 per 
cent plus or minus a fraction. As Pro- 
fessor Oliphant says: 
How exact a particular observation or 
measurement in any science needs to be de- 
pends upon the academic or applied use to 
which it is to be put. The degree of exacti- 
tude needed varies with the subject, with 
the problem of that subject and with the 
aspect of the problem with which one is 
called upon to deal. . . . 
The example cited illustrates a further 
fact which students of the law in particular 
should keep in mind when they despair of 
scientific methods of study. It is that the 
discriminating capacity of the social agency 
available for effectuating changes indicated 
by their studies (e. g., the legislature) will 
constitute the upper limit of exactitude 
which the methods they employ in their 
study need, for many practical purposes, to 
be capable of producing.27 
NEED FOR STANDARD TERMINOLOGY 
We have tried, by placing in juxta- 
position three leading interpretations of 
social science and results that follow 
from them, to demonstrate the utter 
futility of attempting to understand 
sociological literature without a delib- 
erate, thorough attempt to understand 
the terminology employed; that after 
allowances are made for differences in 
terminology, conflicts disappear in 
large measure; and that the necessity 
to make such an analysis and to allow 
for differences in terminology is pecu- 
liarly necessary in the social sciences. 
All of these observations apply equally to attempts to evaluate criminological 
research. 
We should be rare optimists, how- 
ever, if we imagined that the conflicting 
positions indicated in the above dis- 
cussion could be removed by a con- ference on the adoption of a standard 
terminology. We have emphasized 
the necessity to make the attempt 
for any one who wishes merely (!) to 
understand. It would be appalling not 
to believe that a great deal of the 
confusion in contemporary criminology 
would disappear, and we have indicated 
some of the steps necessary to accom- 
plish this. Yet the writer, for one, 
remains skeptical about the appearance 
of a set of symbols which will eliminate 
misunderstanding. For one comes 
away from these discussions with the 
conviction that whether the data are 
unique or not, we will for an indefinite 
future be handicapped by our inability 
to identify social data with sufficient 
particularity.28 
Reference to any of the data dealt 
with in the various social disciplines 
supports this opinion. The existence 
of physical objects which can be 
universally and sufflciently identified 
and discussed, which can literally be 
pointed to anywhere and everywhere, 
facilitates research in the natural 
sciences. What social data exist which 
everybody everywhere will identify 
uniformly? It may be granted that 
the processes of perception are one and 
the same, but this does not alter the 
results nor eliminate existing diffi- 
culties. 
Moreover, one of the most difficult 
things imaginable in dealing with social 
phenomena is to find words which do 
27 Oliphant, H., "Facts, Opinions, and Value- 
Judgments" (1932), 10 Tex, L. Rev., p. 130. 
28 "The great PoincarT once remarked that 
while physicists had a subject matter, sociologists 
were engaged almost entirely in considering their 
methods . . . there is still in this remark a just 
rebuke . . to those romantic souls who cherish 
the persistent illusion that by some new trick of 
method the social sciences can readily be put on a 
par with the physical sciences in regard to defi- 
niteness and universal demonstrability. The 
maximum logical accuracy can be attained only 
by recognizing the exact degree of probability 
that our subject matter will allow." M. R. 
Cohen, "The Social Sciences and The Natural 
Sciences," in Ogburn and Goldenweiser, Social 
Sciences and Their Interrelations, p. 454; included 
also in Cohen's Reason and Nature, 
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not connote to some extent either 
approval or disapproval. A perfectly 
enormous number of words used in 
social science more or less subtly imply 
emotional affects of this sort. 
DIFFICULTY OF ATTAINING 
OBJECTIVITY 
Another tremendous difficulty which 
besets the student of social phenomena 
is the practical impossibility of achiev- 
ing a high degree of objectivity. 
Recognition of the existence and the 
importance of both this and the lin- 
guistic problem in contemporary social 
research is entirely consistent with all 
three of the positions discussed, and 
indeed is the most instructive lesson 
that must be derived from them. 
Significantly enough, theses that the 
study of social data is indistinguishable 
from that of physical data in any 
essential characteristic have not satis- 
factorily disposed of the striking fact 
that the observer is unavoidably 
involved in the whole set-up in a 
manner unlike that found in connection 
with the exact sciences. It is to be 
borne in mind that social phenomena 
do not allow of simple, direct recording 
on physical objects (machines, devices, 
litmus, and so forth) as do physical 
phenomena. There is always the in- 
tervention of the observer who must 
serve as both "conductor" and re- 
corder of what he has sensed. 
Some of the psychoanalysts, indeed, 
have suggested that social scientists 
should subject themselves to examina- 
tion in order to discover any com- 
plexes which might influence them. 
This, however, is only a small part of 
the difficulty. For every "normal" 
person is a combination of instincts, 
drives, sentiments, and prejudices of 
every sort and description. He may 
be unconscious of these preferences; he 
may think he has them under control; 
but he cannot escape the common 
humanity he shares. Some degree of 
desire for amelioration in human 
society seems unescapable, and in- 
separable from the study of social 
phenomena. 
Research in the physical sciences, 
however, can be carried on with relative 
indifference regarding results one way 
or another. At the same time it is 
generally believed that magic preceded 
science, and that the high degree of 
objectivity which is now found in the 
physical sciences is in large measure 
made possible by the existence of a very 
large number of abstractions which 
have been created during a long period 
of time. 
But we are concerned here with the 
present status of the social disciplines 
rather than with future possibilities. 
And to that end, it is necessary to 
recognize that men studying human 
beings are not in the same position as 
men studying rock formations. The 
"social data" are studying the ob- 
server at the same time that he is 
studying them; while he is trying to 
control them, they are controlling him 
or trying to. 
Criminology, of all social disciplines, 
suffers very considerably from this 
limitation upon our resources. Men 
who attack person and property are 
met by many human responses which 
consist of various sorts of behavior, 
but certainly not by the impersonal, 
dispassionate, even indifferent attitude 
that is associated with objectivity in 
the physical sciences. 
BIASED VIEWPOINTS 
The particular type of functioning of 
an individual over a period of years 
undoubtedly affects not only what he 
observes but how he interprets. Pro- 
fessionalism among lawyers has its 
counterpart in every vocation. The 
prosecutor is invariably "hard boiled" 
to the academician, who in turn is an 
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impractical "reformer" to the experi- 
enced administrator. No doubt the 
prosecutor considers himself a realist, 
just as the academic person is convinced 
that he is an impartial observer. 
As a matter of fact, all the influences 
of no one knows how many years back, 
operate on both. The prosecutor with 
his particular bent has become immedi- 
ately and more sharply conditioned by 
being thrown into a fight as champion 
of the group and of an unfortunate 
victim. That the academic person is 
similarly conditioned, though by other 
influences no less potent, is only 
another way of saying that he is human 
and that he has lived in a group of 
human beings. 
It inevitably follows that a great 
part of what passes as criminology 
consists of apology or condemnation, 
of "explanation" which is really ap- 
probation, of expressions of beliefs or 
convictions in severity or leniency; in 
short, of advocacy of one sort or 
another. The invention of techniques 
is a valiant effort to diminish this 
inevitable human bias and prejudice. 
Admitting that social phenomena 
can be studied to advantage by natural 
science methods, can it be said that to 
date they have done more than barely 
scratch the surface? To further im- 
mediate utilization of existing knowl- 
edge it is necessary, first, to recognize 
the existence of bias and prejudice; 
second, to make such allowances as we 
can from a detailed knowledge of the 
observer (no life histories can ever be 
complete enough to enable us to allow 
accurately and fully for all bias, even if 
we know how to interpret all the de- 
tails); and third, to recognize and 
account for our own bias as far as 
possible. 
DEFINITION OF CRIME 
Symptomatic of the status of crim- 
inology in the hierarchy of the sciences 
is the fact that no satisfactory defini- 
tion of crime exists. There is more 
than a linguistic difficulty involved in 
the inability of criminologists to agree 
upon a definition of their subject 
matter. Definition is essential to dis- 
course; in addition to this minimum 
logical requirement, it is necessary to 
bound the areas within which crim- 
inologists are to work, for the purpose 
of actually working there. 
At this particular time a number of 
leading criminologists have adopted 
the legal definition of crime, i. e., the 
violation of a penal law. Now this 
definition is adequate for the individual 
whose concern is whether or not he will 
be punished because he violated a law. 
There is point and meaning in the 
formal definition of crime for this 
purpose. But the criminologist who 
adopts the formal definition makes his 
principal purpose the study of behavior 
which is in violation of penal laws; and 
so far as conduct is concerned, no one 
has pointed out any common char- 
acteristic of criminal behavior so 
defined. On the contrary, lawyers 
have for many years differentiated 
criminal laws as felonies and mis- 
demeanors, and on the Continent, as 
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations 
of mere police orders. 
Yet the formal definition of crime 
makes no distinctions; and if the crim- 
inologists were really influenced by this 
definition in the selection of areas of 
research, they would be just as inter- 
ested in traffic violations as in murder, 
robbery, or rape. Moreover, a person 
may be guilty of violating some laws 
(manslaughter) though he does not 
act at all; and of violating other 
laws (narcotic) by being in possession 
of drugs though he is entirely innocent 
of the fact. About 75 per cent of the 
criminal cases tried in the Federal 
courts are the result of laws passed 
during the last twenty-five years. 
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The repeal of the Volstead law will 
mean an enormous quantitative limi- 
tation of the field. What can be done 
with reference to studying types of 
criminals, i. e., of persons who violate 
penal laws, or regarding the causes of 
such violations, under these circum- 
stances? 
As a matter of fact, criminologists 
are really influenced by the older 
sociological definition of crime and by 
other considerations. However, they 
have thus far been unable to analyze 
their problems and their interests 
sufficiently to define their field; or else 
criminology is composed of several 
fields which overlap and intersect at 
so many points that it is impossible to 
detect any common characteristics. 
In either event, this is a serious limita- 
tion. 
USE OF OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES 
IN LAW 
There remain a number of addi- 
tional special difficulties which con- 
front students of the criminal law.29 
We pass over the dominance of tra- 
ditional techniques, the necessity to 
follow precedent, and the reverence 
for authority, all of which make the 
adoption of a scientific attitude all but 
impossible. Related in varying de- 
grees to all of these is the very im- 
portant consideration that problems 
in the administration of law almost 
always depend upon social policy 
rather than upon social science. A 
serious difficulty which students of the 
law encounter when they look to the 
social sciences for assistance in their 
own discipline has been pointed out by 
Professor K. N. Llewellyn as follows: 
In short, then, as to the data already 
available from the social sciences, one can 
say this: all of their material is suggestive 
for us; little of it is more. They have not 
gathered their data for our purposes, and 
most of what we want to know we shall 
have to find out for ourselves. Not only 
are hypotheses likely to be limited to the 
data on which they rest, but data also are 
selected, recorded and classified for the pur- 
pose in hand; and data selected, recorded 
and classified for one purpose are exceed- 
ingly likely to be blind or misleading when 
approached for another purpose. The social 
scientist has repeatedly left out of con- 
sideration precisely the portions of the situ- 
ation which for us are most relevant or 
puzzling.30 
While systematic correlation of law 
and other social science is still for the 
most part confined to devout exhorta- 
tion, knowledge from other fields has 
always seeped into the law."* In the 
29 ,. .. a science of law cannot be built on 
experimentation. Like geology its rational 
branch must rest on testing by observation." 
H. Oliphant, " A Return to Stare Decisis " (1927), 
14 A. B. A. Jour. 76. 
The doctors have to a degree introduced ex- 
perimentation into medicine. Thus Dr. F. S. 
Lee writes: "The modern physician does not rely 
on a philosophical system . . . he alters the 
conditions and thus he obtains an alteration of the 
phenomena and a new standpoint from which to 
view them. He may apply to the disease past 
experience, it is true, but it is past experience 
that has been put to the test of modern experi- 
ment. Moreover by the aid of further experiment 
he pushes out into the unknown, sees dis- 
ease from unusual standpoints, and devises new 
and hitherto unsuspected methods of dealing 
with it." Scientific Features of Modern Medicine (1911). 
It may be questioned whether experimentation 
must be forever barred from law. In Sweden, 
legislation is adopted for a limited period after 
study by a board of experts. During the ensuing 
period the operation of the statute is studied. 
Again, in the treatment of offenders there would 
seem to be room for experimentation. It would 
undoubtedly be limited and would require an 
attitude on the part of officials which cannot at 
present be expected; but the problem certainly 
seems worthy of consideration. 
30"The Conditions for and the Aims and 
Methods of Legal Research" (1930), 6 The Am. 
Law School Rev. 677. 
31 It is a long stretch from the days when only 
those who were as "mad as a wild beast" escaped 
liability to, the recognition by courts in their 
actual practices, of borderline cases of abnormal- 
ity which are not as yet expressly provided for in 
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present century only, has the attempt 
been made by a few legal scholars to 
become thoroughly familiar with at 
least one social discipline in addition 
to their own. This has been directed 
by a deeply felt necessity, for, as 
Professor Llewellyn has stated, the 
legal scholar cannot bodily take over 
very much of the work of the social 
scientists in its present form. 
NEED FOR LAWYER-CRIMINOLOGISTS 
This is unfortunate, and its signifi- 
cance for criminal law cannot be 
exaggerated. Indeed, in a sense, the 
whole cause of the inadequacy of 
criminology for the criminal law (in 
addition to the limitations of crim- 
inology in itself) may be epitomized as 
follows: The criminologists are not 
lawyers, and the lawyers are not 
criminologists. More specifically, we 
do not have technologists who are 
equipped to apply criminology to the 
administration of the law. In con- 
trast with a number of European 
countries, we have taken hardly any 
deliberate steps to develop the neces- 
sary technology. In Italy and Ger- 
many, for example, the teachers of 
criminal law are very frequently com- 
petent criminologists who direct insti- 
tutes and carry on research.32 
It should be reasonably clear at this 
time that a criminology constructed in 
ignorance of legal problems is all but 
impotent to improve the administra- 
tion of criminal law. The most strik- 
ing example of the failure to understand 
legal purposes and problems and of 
consequent ineffectuality is provided 
by criminal psychiatry, which is gen- 
erally selected as the high mark of 
accomplishment in the field. Passing 
over the dogmatism that arises from 
most criminal codes. (The Briggs Law in Massa- 
chusetts is still the outstanding exception.) 
Contributions of chemistry, bacteriology, and 
ballistics have been utilized by the courts very 
generally. The juvenile court is perhaps the out- 
standing example of an administration of the 
criminal law which has been influenced con- 
siderably by social science. It follows from the 
position taken in this paper that efficient utiliza- 
tion of the data and research in the social sciences 
is inevitably dependent upon personnel. The 
recent ecological studies of Park, Shaw, and 
Sutherland objectify conclusions of experience 
previously held and, moreover, provide a tech- 
nique for a more discriminate utilization of the 
knowledge. Other important studies which 
command attention are those on parole predic- 
tion, especially by Burgess, Glueck, and Vold. 
It seems reasonable to expect that with the aid of 
psychiatry these tables may shortly be utilized 
not only by parole boards but also by judges in 
helping to decide doubtful cases of application 
for probation, and even farther back than that, 
by prosecutors in helping them to decide whether 
to proceed or to nolle prosequi in doubtful cases. 
Here would seem to be a unique opportunity for 
experimentation. 
32 "Outside of the English-speaking world 
these things have been understood for a long 
time. The nineteenth century jurists and law 
teachers of continental Europe carried scientific 
study and development of the criminal law a long 
way. On the Continent, every land has con- 
spicuous leaders in the scientific treatment of 
criminal law. In every land strong teachers and 
creative writers and investigators may be found, 
in criminal law no less than in public law and 
private law. Indeed, in the universities of con- 
tinental Europe specialists in criminal law have 
known or have learned how to work with 
specialists in all the sciences that bear on criminal 
investigation and penal legislation and adminis- 
tration. We, on the other hand, have all but left 
the field to enthusiasts and cranks and char- 
latans." R. Pound, " What Can Law Schools 
Do For Criminal Justice?" (1927) 12 Iowa L. 
Rev. 112. 
An example is given by Dr. R. Grassberger, 
who writes: "In the spring of 1923 the Austrian 
Department of Education ... founded the 
.. Institute. Incorporated as part of the 
university Law School. . . . The work of the 
Institute is divided into three branches . . . I. 
Instruction to law students in the criminological 
sciences. . . . The purpose of instruction at the 
Institute is to supplement the legal training af- 
forded the student through the chief lecture 
courses by a varied knowledge which will serve 
him later in his capacity as judge, prosecuting 
attorney, defense attorney or public official." 
"The University Institute of the Criminologic 
Sciences and Criminalistics in Vienna" (1932), 23 
Jour. of Cr. Law and Criminol. 395-6. 
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neglect to appreciate the significance 
of the existence of a dozen conflicting 
schools of psychology, and of the effect 
that this must have upon administra- 
tive officials, there has been a failure to 
consider sufficiently the distinctive 
ends of the law and the philosophy 
through which these ends have been 
conceived. 
Only by making this attempt is it 
possible to understand, for example, 
why individualization is given only a 
limited application as a result of the 
legal assumption of free-willing and 
therefore responsible individuals, while 
psychiatry proceeds upon other hy- 
potheses, the result being that it is 
constructed upon an entirely different 
level. Recognition of this would per- 
mit greater utilization of psychiatry in 
the administration of the law. And 
we may conclude, in general, that the 
usefulness of criminology in law must 
inevitably depend upon the appearance 
of lawyer-criminologists;33 that is, of 
experts who have been trained in both 
fields and are able to understand the 
problems that arise in the administra- 
tion of the criminal law and know how 
to utilize criminology in the solution 
of them. 
33 " What is needed is that some scholar, or 
better, some group of scholars, think ahead of the 
subject, uncover its problems before they arise in 
the courts, perceive the relation of its problems to 
the history of the criminal law and to the ends of 
the criminal law to-day, study the adaptation of 
our legal materials to those problems, and thus 
give direction to doctrinal development and ad- 
judication, and legislation." R. Pound, "What 
Can Law Schools Do For Criminal Justice?" 
(1927), 12 Iowa L. Rev. 110. 
Jerome Hall is professor of law at the University of 
North Dakota, is on leave of absence, and the holder of a 
Special Teacher's Fellowship in Columbia University 
School of Law. He practiced law in Chicago from 
1923 to 1929, during which time he was also 
lecturer on law at Indiana University (Gary Ex- 
tension). He was an assistant State's attorney of 
Cook County, Illinois, in the summer of 1931. He 
has written a number of articles on criminal law and on 
the relationship between law and the social sciences. 
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